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Abstract 
The present study examined the impact of the accessibility 
of justice-related concepts when assigning punishment. Across two 
experiments, participants first were paired with either a pro-social 
or anti-social target. Next, participants received either an ethics 
prime (experiments 1 and 2) or a legality prime (experiment 2) 
compared to a control prime (experiments 1 and 2). Finally, 
participants reported their intentions to punish the target by taking 
money from him in an economic game (experiment 1) or their 
behavioral intentions to punish the target (experiment 2). We 
predicted and found that punishment assignment was greater for 
those participants who were paired with the anti-social target and 
activated the idea of justice-related concepts than for those who did 
not activate it. 
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People need to know that offenders are punished for their offenses 
(e.g. Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002; Darley, Carlsmith, & 
Robinson, 2000; Wenzel & Thielmann, 2006). In addition, the idea 
of punishment as a means for retribution in modern western 
civilizations has been the key in constructing judicial and law 
systems (e.g. Carlsmith, 2006; Carlsmith et al., 2002). Indeed, in 
order to protect their ideal of justice, societies require just deserts 
punishments  (Darley,  2001).  In  the  same  vein,  the  status  
degradation  and  the disempowerment imposed by the  legal  
system to  the offender is a punishment that serves a just 
deserts perspective (Darley & Pittman, 2003). That is, it is not 
only a legal issue that maintains social order, but also responds 
to a psychological need for citizens who live in society, which 
need to know that their environment is a safe and just place 
where people obtain what they deserve (Lerner, 1980; Lerner & 
Miller, 1978). 
Research on social justice over 30 years has provided 
invaluable insight into motives for punishment (for a review, see 
Carlsmith & Darley, 2008). One theoretical approach to study this 
phenomenon has been formulated by the just deserts belief. This 
belief implies the conviction that one gets what he or she 
deserves (Carlsmith et al., 2002; Gerber & Jackson, 2013; 
Wenzel & Thielmann, 2006), and it is based on the idea that 
justice can only  be  restored when  the  individuals  who  harm  
society  by  breaking its  rules  are sanctioned. Thus, punishment 
is seen as an appropriate sanction when is proportional to the 
harm inflicted by offenders (Carlsmith et al., 2002). 
From a just deserts approach, punishment presents more 
than one characteristic: punishment can be imposed unilaterally, 
the offender does not have to agree with it, he does not have to 
admit it, nor does he have to be affected by feelings of 
remorse. Furthermore, this notion of punishment, in itself, is able 
to restore the idea of justice that has been defied by the offenders 
(Feather, 1996, 1998). 
For instance, in a recent study, Gromet and Darley (2006) 
concluded that in order to achieve perception of justice, at least 
for serious offenses, the legal system must impose retributive 
justice measures (e.g., imprisonment) because participants did 
not reach this perception simply with restorative justice 
measures (e.g., compensation for the victim, offender 
repentance or rehabilitation). In line with that, they argue that 
there are two steps for achieving a sense of justice in ordinary 
citizens: (1) repair the damage caused to the victim, and (2) to 
punish offenders who have committed offenses. They found that 
only the second step is essential in achieving this perception of 
justice. 
Literature has proposed a theoretical model to explain this 
second step of justice perception: the Retribution Model (just 
deserts), which suggests that people support punishment by its 
capacity to make criminals pay for their offenses (Bohm, 1987; 
Vidmar & Miller, 1980). When people are in charge of 
assigning punishment, their motives to punish are consistent 
with a just deserts notion of justice (Carlsmith et al., 2002). 
 
Self-validation and justice accesibility 
Following these findings, it is crucial to study under which 
conditions this need for punishment might be increased. 
Drawing on the self-validation hypothesis in persuasion (Petty, 
Brin˜ol, & Tormala, 2002; for a review, see Brin˜ol & Petty, 2009), 
people’s reliance on  and  use  of  their  social  judgments  can  
vary  as  a  function  of  other  variables. We hypothesize that 
one of these variables that might increase people’s reliance on 
their judgments (and therefore, their use) may be justice 
accessibility. The core idea of self- validation  is  that  thoughts  
alone  are  not  sufficient for  predicting  subsequent social 
judgments. Rather, people must also rely on their thoughts for 
them to have a marked influence on resulting judgments. 
People facing an anti-social person might generate thoughts 
about punishing him for their actions. Then, increasing 
confidence in the validity of their thoughts should increase 
intentions to punish, but increasing doubt about their validity of 
their thoughts should decrease intentions to punish. However, 
when thoughts are primarily favorable such as when people face a 
pro-social target, increasing confidence in their judgments should 
decrease intentions to punish, but increasing doubt about their 
judgments should increase intentions to punish. Justice 
accessibility might validate (i.e., increase validity in one’s 
thoughts) people’s intentions to punish more (vs. less) a target 
compared with a control condition for several reasons. One 
reason is that priming justice can validate people’s thoughts by 
leading them to feel good because the environment, including 
their thoughts, is a safe, secure place (Brin˜ol, Gasco´ , Petty, & 
Horcajo, 2013; Brin˜ol, Petty, & Barden, 2007; Paredes, Stavraki, 
Brin˜ol, & Petty, 2013). A second reason might be that priming 
justice makes feel participants that they are in a position to 
judge, therefore they are powerful (Brin˜ol, Petty, & Stavraki, 
2012; Brin˜ol, Petty, Valle, Rucker, & Becerra, 2007; DeMarree, 
Brin˜ol, & Petty, 2014; DeMarree et al., 2012). A third 
possibility is that priming justice might self-affirm people 
because the priming matches with their personal values of 
justice or honesty (Brin˜ol, Petty, Gallardo, & DeMarree, 2007).  
For all this reasons, we hypothesize that justice accesibility 
should increase reliance on one’s thoughts that ultimately should 
lead to increase intentions to punish anti-social targets and 
decrease intentions to punish pro-social targets. In this research, 
we increased justice accessibility through a priming technique. 
Past literature on the automaticity of human behavior suggests 
that priming a concept automatically activates in our mind 
schemes  related  to  that  concept  (Bargh,  2006;  Dijksterhuis 
&  Bargh,  2001).   
As  a consequence of this activation, the concept that has 
been activated is temporarily more accessible for those who 
have been exposed to the prime and it is more likely for them to 
use it to interpret, perceive, and judge information. The specific 
content of the priming task was related to different codes of ethics 
(deontology) or to different articles of the Spanish Constitution. 
In fact, a number of academics have shown that there exists a 
relationship between deontology, legality  and justice  (Haidt &  
Kesebir, 2010; Kant, 1785/2011; Sokoloff, 2005). There is a 
common element underlying these concepts: the presence of a 
normative code that guides how people have to behave in 
order to reach moral good, utility, virtue, happiness, and so on. 
(Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). There are other concepts that imply a 
normative code that recommends how to behave in harmony and 
virtuously such as religion (e.g., the Ten Commandments, see 
Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). 
Moreover, findings claim that making the idea of justice 
more accessible in people’s minds has led those individuals 
either to behave consistently with the idea of justice made 
accessible when giving forgiveness or revenge (Strelan, Feather, 
& McKee, 2008; Van Tongeren, Welch, Davis, Green, & 
Worthington, 2012) or to reduce their dishonesty (Mazar et al., 
2008). For instance, Van Tongeren et al. (2012) found that by 
making the idea of retributive justice more accessible or salient 
this leads religious people to have more negative evaluations of 
moral transgressors compared to those who have in mind the idea 
of forgiveness. Recently, the evidence on the spontaneous 
activation of social justice inferences suggests that people can 
infer the morality of an event they face via automatic judgments 
of that event (Ham & van den Bos, 2011) which, in turn, leads 
to think that justice judgments can be influenced by automatic 
clues or stated through low-effort processes. We think that 
intentions to punish can be validated via priming justice-related 
concepts through a more effortful, self-validation process. 
 
Experiment 1 
In this study, we examined the effect of the accessibility of ethics 
when people encounter a target who behaves either in a prosocial 
or an anti-social way. We predict that people’s desire to punish a 
person who breaks the rules by harming innocent people will be 
stronger when the idea of ethics was made accessible in 
people’s minds. On the other hand, in accord with a self-
validation account, we expect the pro-social neighbor to be judged 
more favorably following the ethics prime because people might 
rely on their positive thoughts and punish the target even less 
compared with the control condition. 
 
Method 
Participants and design 
Eighty-eight undergraduate students at a large northern 
university were randomly assigned to a 2 (Target: pro-social 
neighbor vs. anti-social neighbor) × 2 (Prime: ethics vs. control) 
between-subjects factorial design. Participants’ ages ranged from 
18 to 56, M(age) = 25.49, SD = 8.19. Four participants were 
removed from the final sample due to the fact that they were 
immigrant people
i
.  The data from the remaining 84 participants 
(36 men, 48 women) was retained in the final sample. The 
statistical power achieved in this study to detect the key two-way 
interaction was .64. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were induced to believe that they were going 
to be involved in a research in which personality scales related to 
economic dilemmas in the academic and professional context  
were  being  tested.  They  were  told  that  their  responses  
were  completely anonymous and would be used to validate those 
economic dilemmas. Once the informed consent  was  obtained,  
all  participants  received  written  instructions  asking  them  to 
complete several tasks. In the first manipulation, participants 
were induced to think that they were going to read an interview 
extracted from a real radio program about people’s behaviors 
toward immigrant neighbors. Then, each participant was randomly 
assigned to a condition in which the interview presented a target 
who behaved in a pro-social or anti- social manner with their 
neighbors. Next, as part of the second task, the accessibility of 
justice was manipulated by procedures of priming in which 
participants had to fill in missing words from a selection of ethics 
codes or from a selection of neutral instructions. After completing 
these tasks, as part of an economic dilemma game, all participants 
had to decide the amount of money they wanted to take away 
from the presented target’s winnings during the game. Finally, 
all participants completed some ancillary measures, and were 
debriefed, thanked, and dismissed. None of the participants 
expressed any suspicion about our research, nor could they guess 
our hypotheses. 
 
Independent Variables 
Target. Participants read an interview presenting a 
neighbor who behaves in a pro-social or anti- social manner with 
their neighbors. In the pro-social version of the interview, the 
neighbor collects money to help their neighbors who cannot pay 
the rent. In contrast, in the anti- social version of the interview, 
the neighbor steals the money of a lost wallet that he finds in the 
lift. The interviews were designed and pretested to being similar 
in all aspects but differ only in the pro-sociality of the action 
committed by the target 
 
Prime. Participants completed a paragraph-completion 
task. Instructions asked participants to determine what word was 
the appropriate for filling in the blank. Participants were told that no 
words were more appropriate than others. Prime words included in 
the paragraph were associated with ethics (e.g., honesty, 
confidence, integrity,  righteous, loyal, truthful, diligent, and so 
on) or with neutral topics (e.g., box, department, detergent, 
softener, computer, and so on). These words were part of three 
paragraphs belonging to the codes of ethics of physicians, lawyers 
and psychologists or part of three paragraphs belonging to the 
instructions sheet of computers, washing machines, and LEGO 
constructions. The length of the paragraphs in both conditions was 
equal. Similar task have been used successfully to prime other 
constructs (e.g., Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Tro¨ 
tschel, 2001; Kay & Ross, 2003; Srull & Wyer, 1979) and this task 
was conceptually similar to those used in past research that has 
primed the construct of justice or honesty (Mazar et al., 2008). 
 
Dependent Measures 
Economic Game. Following the prime induction, participants 
were asked to take part in an economic decision- making task. 
Participants were told to imagine they were playing with the 
presented person in the interview (i.e., the target) for actual 
money. This task was a version of the Dictator Game (e.g., Bolton, 
Katok, & Zwick, 1998; see also Experiment 1, DeMarree et al., 
2012). In this version of the Dictator Game, participants were told to 
imagine that they would be the administrators of the game. In this 
game, they had not won anything, and the target had won €100. As 
administrators, participants had the power to decide whether the 
target kept their winnings or, on the contrary, take away a 
percentage of the money from him. Values on this dependent 
measure went from 0 to 100% (i.e., this is equals to €0– €100). 
Higher values on this task thus represent greater intentions to 
punish the target. 
 
Manipulation Check.  After participants completed the 
dependent measure, they were asked to indicate, on a number of 9-
point scales, the perceived morality and tolerance of the target. 
Since ratings on these two items were highly correlated (r = .87, p 
< .001), we thus averaged and computed a composite measure of 
target’s morality.  
 
Results 
Economic game.  The 2 × 2 ANOVA revealed a main effect for 
Target such that participants who read the immoral neighbor 
interview reported more intentions to take money from the target 
(M = 34.66, SD = 42.41) than those who read the moral neighbor 
interview (M = 13.09, SD = 24.65), F(1, 80) = 9.53, p = .003, η2 = 
.11.  A significant main effect for Prime also emerged, F(1, 80) = 
6.85, p = .011, η2 = .08,  showing that participants reported more 
intentions to take money from the target when they were in a moral 
prime (M = 32.95, SD = 39) than in a control prime (M = 14.72, 
SD = 30.63). More germane to our primary concerns, these main 
effects were qualified by a significant two-way interaction between 
Target and Prime, F(1, 80) = 5.19, p = .025, η2 = .06. As predicted 
and illustrated in Figure 1, for participants who read the immoral 
neighbor interview, those who received a moral prime reported 
more intentions to take money from the target (M = 52.50, SD = 
7.29) than those who received a control prime (M = 17.67, SD = 
7.11), F(1, 80) = 11.70, p = .001, η2 = .13.  For participants who 
read the moral neighbor interview, as expected, there was no 
difference across conditions. Specifically, those receiving the 
moral prime slightly reported more intentions to take money from 
the target (M = 14.93, SD = 7.11) than those receiving the control 
prime (M = 11.91, SD = 6.95), F(1, 80) = .059, p = .81, η2 = .001, 
although this difference was not significant.  
 To put it differently, in the moral prime condition, 
participants who read the immoral neighbor interview reported 
more intentions to take money from the target (M = 52.50, SD = 
7.29) than did those who read the moral neighbor interview, (M = 
14.33, SD = 7.11), F(1, 80) = 14.05, p < .001, η2 = .15. On the 
other hand, among participants in the control prime condition, 
there was no difference in the money taken between those who 
read the immoral neighbor interview (M = 17.67, SD = 7.11) and 
those who read the moral neighbor interview (M = 11.91, SD = 
6.95), F(1, 80) = .34, p = .56, η2 = .004.  
Manipulation Check. The 2 × 2 ANOVA only revealed a 
main effect for Target such that participants who read the moral 
neighbor interview reported more perceived morality of the target 
(M = 7.79, SD = 1.29) than those who read the immoral neighbor 
interview (M = 2.68, SD = 1.34), F(1, 80) = 312.348, p < .001, η2 = 
.80. No other main effect or interaction emerged, ps > .49.   
 
Discussion 
The present study shows that the desire to punish an 
offender who breaks the rules is greater when the idea of ethics is 
accessible in people’s minds than when it is not. Thereby, justice 
accessibility increases the punishment received by an offender 
when he behaves in an anti-social way. These results show for the 
first time what happens when the idea of justice is made 
accessible in people’s minds following the reading of an anti-
social (vs. pro-social) target description. The effect found here is 
partially supported by the self- validation hypothesis (Brin˜ ol & 
Petty, 2009) since participants relied more on their intentions to 
punish the target when received the ethics prime compared with 
the control condition but only for the anti-social target. It can be 
argued that the null effect for the pro- social target might be due to 
a floor effect. Interestingly, the differences in the control 
condition yielded unexpected results in which judging an anti-
social target did not differ from judging a pro-social target enough 
to hold statistical significance, although the data approach this 
threshold. Normally, one would expect the desire to punish the 
anti-social target to be significantly greater when compared with 
the pro-social target, regardless of the more accessible idea in 
one’s mind. Moreover, the current experiment presents other 
limitations. First, the study did not achieve a sufficient statistical 
power (.80) to detect the key two-way interaction. Second, the 
dependent variable had variance concerns due to its metric (from 0 
to 100). This situation led participants to rate their desire to punish 
on the extremes (0 or 100) which, in turn, led to an increase in 
the variance. Finally, the dependent variable lacked reliability 
because it was measured with one indicator rather than a set of 
items. The second experiment was designed to address these 
limitations. 
 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was conducted in order to reach different 
objectives. First, we aimed to provide a direct as well as a conceptual 
replication of the previous study by adding a different priming 
induction as a new condition in which participants had to fill in words 
related to legal justice. In the first experiment, participants had to fill 
in ethics-relevant concepts such as loyalty or righteousness. Since 
there were only ethics-relevant concepts in the manipulation, we 
aimed to extend these results to the legal justice arena by priming 
only concepts related to legality such as “law”, “fundamental 
rights”, “norm”, and so on in one condition. Since ethics and 
legality are two related concepts that imply a normative code that 
recommends people how to behave in harmony and virtuously, we 
hypothesize that there will be no dramatic differences between how 
the ethics and legality prime affect behavioral intentions to punish. 
This would be the case also for other procedures to manipulate a 
normative code such as Christian morality (e.g., the Ten 
Commandments, see Mazar et al., 2008) or the lex talionis (“an eye 
for an eye”). Second, as we lacked statistical power to detect the 
key finding, we increased the sample size required to achieve 
sufficient power. Finally, we changed the dependent variable for two 
reasons: (a) variance concerns due to the metric of the scale (using a 
nine-point scale instead of a measure from 0 to 100), and (b) reliability 
concerns (using six items instead of just one measure of punishment 
intentions). 
 
 
Method 
Participants and design 
One hundred and seventy seven undergraduate students at a 
large northern university were randomly assigned to a 2 (Target: 
moral neighbor vs. immoral neighbor) × 3 (Prime: moral vs. justice 
vs. control) between-subjects factorial design. Participants’ ages 
ranged from 17 to 30, M(age) = 18.76, SD = 1.85 (77 men, 100 
women). In order to improve the statistical observed power found 
in the first study, we conducted an anticipatory power analysis 
using the statistical software G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & 
Buchner, 2007), aiming to achieve a power of .80. This value was 
calculated as a function of the effect size of the interaction 
uncovered in Experiment 1 (η2 = .06). Results of this analysis 
suggested that we needed a sample size of at least 123 subjects in 
case of four conditions. Since we added one experimental 
condition (two cells), we included 54 more participants. This study 
achieved a statistical observed power to detect the key two-way 
interaction of .90. 
 
Procedure 
The procedure was largely the same as in Experiment 1. 
 Independent Variables 
Target. As in Experiment 1, participants read an interview 
presenting a neighbor who behaves in a pro-social or anti-social 
manner with their neighbors. 
 
Prime. Participants completed the same paragraph-completion 
task as in Experiment 1 with an additional condition. In this new 
condition, the words they had to fill in were part of three 
paragraphs belonging to three articles of the Spanish Constitution. 
Prime words included in these paragraphs were associated 
exclusively with legal terms (e.g., norm, human rights, judicial 
system, law, democracy, public order, and so on). 
 
Dependent Measures. 
Behavioral Intentions of Punishment. Following the prime 
induction, participants were asked on a set of nine-point scales 
their desire to punish the target with different types of 
punishment including positive and negative punishment, direct 
and indirect, and social and physical (i.e., “To what extent do you 
want to punish the target?”, “To what extent do you want to punch 
the target?”, “If you knew the target, how likely would it be for you 
to stop talking to him?”, “How likely would it be for you to get 
angry with the target?”, “How likely would it be for you to ignore 
the target?”, “To what extent do you want a misfortune to happen 
to the target?”). Ratings on these items were highly inter-
correlated (α = .86) and were thus averaged to create a 
behavioral intention index of punishment. 
 
Manipulation Check. As in Experiment 1, participants were asked to 
indicate the perceived morality and tolerance of the target. Since 
we added one condition related to legal justice, participants were 
also asked about the perceived justice. Ratings on these three 
items were highly correlated (α = .93), and then were averaged to 
compute a measure of target’s pro-sociality. 
 
Results 
 Behavioral Intentions of Punishment. The 2 × 3 ANOVA 
revealed a main effect for Target such that participants who read 
the immoral neighbor interview reported more intentions to punish 
the target (M = 4.72, SD = 1.62) than those who read the moral 
neighbor interview (M = 2.13, SD = 1.32), F(1, 171) = 146.80, p < 
.001, η2 = .46.  More germane to our primary concerns, these main 
effects were qualified by a significant two-way interaction between 
Target and Prime, F(1, 171) = 5.11, p = .007, η2 = .056. As 
predicted and illustrated in Figure 2, for participants who read the 
immoral neighbor interview, those who received a justice prime (M 
= 5.15, SD = 1.25) or a moral prime (M = 5.03, SD = 1.88) 
reported more intentions to punish the target than those who 
received a control prime (M = 4.08, SD = 1.45), F(1, 171) = 4.85, p 
= .009, η2 = .054ii.  For participants who read the moral neighbor 
interview, as expected, there was no difference across conditions. 
Specifically, those receiving the control prime (M = 2.40, SD = 
1.59) slightly reported more intentions to punish the target than 
those receiving the moral prime (M = 2.09, SD = 1.25) and justice 
prime (M = 1.87, SD = 1.01), F(1, 171) = .1.06, p = .35, η2 = .01, 
although none of these pairs of differences was statistically 
significant
iii
.  
 Described differently, in the justice prime condition, 
participants who read the immoral neighbor interview reported 
more intentions to punish the target (M = 5.15, SD = 1.25) than did 
those who read the moral neighbor interview, (M = 1.87, SD = 
1.01), F(1, 171) = 69.50, p < .001, η2 = .29. Among participants in 
the moral prime condition, those who read the immoral neighbor 
interview reported more intentions to punish the target (M = 5.03, 
SD = 1.88) than did those who read the moral neighbor interview, 
(M = 2.09, SD = 1.25), F(1, 171) = 62.43, p < .001, η2 = .27. 
Finally, among participants in the control prime condition, those 
who read the immoral neighbor interview also reported more 
intentions to punish the target (M = 4.08, SD = 1.45) than did those 
who read the moral neighbor interview, (M = 2.40, SD = 1.59), 
F(1, 171) = 21.41, p < .001, η2 = .11.  
Manipulation Check. As in Experiment 1, the 2 × 3 
ANOVA only revealed a main effect for Target, F(1, 171) = 
347.27, p < .001, η2 = .67. No other main effect or interaction 
emerged, ps > .59.  
 
Discussion 
The present study successfully replicated the results found in 
Experiment 1. The present experiment  increased  the  statistical  
power  of  Experiment  1,  used  a  more  reliable dependent 
measure, managed to  explain the  odd results found in  the  
control prime condition in the previous study and extended the 
results to legality accessibility in addition to ethics accessibility. 
The results showed that the desire to punish an anti-social target 
was greater when the idea of ethics or legality was accessible in 
people’s minds than when it is not (control prime). Thereby, the 
accessibility of justice-related concepts increased the 
punishment received by an offender when he behaved in an anti-
social way. 
 
General Discussion 
Across two experiments, we predicted and found that punishment 
assignment was greater for those participants who were paired 
with an anti-social target and activated the idea of ethics or 
legality (i.e., justice-related primes) than for those who did not 
activate it (i.e., control prime). We have shown that the desire 
to punish an anti-social target can be increased by a priming 
procedure that would make accessible either ethics (Experiments 
1 and 2) or legality (Experiment 2). As we have pointed out, 
ethics and legality are the two normative codes very related to 
each other; therefore, it is not surprising to find out that they 
produce virtually the same results in the desire to punish an anti-
social target. 
Drawing on the self-validation hypothesis (Petty et al., 
2002; for a review, see Brin˜ol & Petty, 2009), participants who 
read the pro-social neighbor message generated positive thoughts 
toward the target and those who read the anti-social neighbor 
message generated negative thoughts toward the target (with 
the possibility of generating thoughts about punishment). Then, 
the ethics or legality prime played a self-validating role, 
leading participants to rely more on their thoughts in these 
conditions than in the control condition. As a result, people relied 
more on their previous generated thoughts in response to the 
target and they behaved accordingly to those thoughts (taking 
more money from him or punishing him). The future research 
should examine what type of validation would take place (i.e., 
content-dependent or content-independent) when thoughts 
elicited by the message are directly relevant to justice (Clark, 
Wegener, Brin˜ol, & Petty, 2009; Clark, Wegener, Sawicki, 
Petty, & Brin˜ol, 2013). 
Nevertheless, since the effect is more prominent in the anti-
social condition, it could be argued that justice accessibility (vs. 
control) operates as a negative cue or bias, making people 
punishing the target in the anti-social condition. However, we 
argue that this explanation is not very plausible, since the 
intentions to punish a pro-social target were attenuated for those 
who received the ethics and legality prime (vs. control), although 
in this latter conditions the effect is not that clear as it is in the anti-
social target condition. In other words, as explained earlier, 
participants who were presented the pro-social neighbor 
reported fewer intentions to punish the target in the justice-related 
prime conditions than in the control condition. For this reason, 
we argue that a better explanation for the pattern presented is 
that people used their judgments (which ultimately lead them 
to use their intentions to punish) more in the justice-related prime 
(vs. the control) conditions because a negative bias effect could 
not as easily account for the effect in the pro-social target 
condition. As noted, this validation pattern could occur because 
a justice-related prime might make people feel good, safe, 
powerful or self-affirmed that subsequently leads to a greater 
judgment usage (see for example Petty, Brin˜ol, Tormala, & 
Wegener, 2007). 
An alternative explanation is that selfishness is responsible for 
the effect. Participants who were paired with an anti-social 
individual and had ethics or legality primed felt justified to act 
selfishly. That is, punishment serves as a justification (i.e., 
participants invoke just deserts so they can profit) rather than as 
an end (i.e., participants punish the individual because he 
deserves it). However, we cannot address whether confidence, 
selfishness or restoring justice are responsible for these results 
due to a lack of mediational analysis. 
In closing, the present study has a series of limitations. First, 
it is desirable that the results were generalized to other 
economic games and real-life situations, such as field 
experiments in which there were more external validity. 
Second, it would be a better approach to measure actual 
behavior of punishment rather than people’s intentions. Third, the 
results must also be replicated using other priming techniques in 
order to assure that different procedures to make accessible the 
idea of justice might lead to similar outcomes such as providing a 
prime with the Ten Commandments or the lex talionis. 
Finally, the present study might have applications to real-life 
situations. For instance, when there is a trial that requires the 
presence of a jury to determine the defendant’s guilt, any element of 
the courtroom that can serve as a justice prime (e.g., swear to the 
Bible or the scale of justice) can potentially make momentarily 
more accessible the idea of justice in jurors’ minds, leading them 
to adopt higher punishments against defendants who will be tried. 
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Figure 1. Experiment 1. Taken percentage of money as a function 
of Target and Prime. 
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Figure 2. Experiment 2. Behavioral Intentions for Punishment as a 
function of Target and Prime. 
 
 
 
                                                            
i When the four participants were included in the analysis, the 2-
way interaction remained significant, F(1, 84) = 3.977, p = .049, η2 
= .05. 
 
ii Pairwise comparisons were conducted between contrasts. The 
difference between control and moral prime was statistically 
significant, t(171) = -2.58, p = .011, as well as the difference 
between control and justice prime, t(171) = -2.75, p = .007, but the 
difference between justice and moral prime did not yield 
significance, t(171) = .29, p = .77. The difference between the 
moral and justice primes taken together and the control prime was 
also statistically significant, t(171) = -3.11, p = .002. 
 
iii Pairwise comparisons were conducted between contrasts.  The 
difference between control and moral primes did not yield 
significance, t(171) = 0.84, p = .4, nor did the difference between 
control and justice prime, t(171) = 1.44, p = .15, nor the difference 
between justice and moral prime, t(171) = -.60, p = .55.  
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